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ASSIGNMENT-AsSIGNMENT OF HEm's EXPECTANCY-ANCESTOR UNITED IN CON-
VEYANCE.--A deed purported to convey, for ample consideration given to the
grantor, an expectancy in an undivided sixth of real estate then owned by the
grantor's mother, from whom the grantor expected to inherit the interest as one
of her six children. The mother united in the conveyance in order to secure the
interest to the grantee after her death. The deed contained a covenant of war-
ranty by the grantor but not by his mother. Held, that the deed was unenforce-
able as against the son but was valid as a conveyance by the mother. Clay, J.,
dissenting. Snyder v. Snyder (1921, Ky.) 235 S. W. 743.
At common law any assignment or conveyance by an heir of his expected interest
in property, made during the lifetime of the ancestor, was void. .Bayler v. Comn-.
monmealth (i861) 40 Pa. 37; 33 L. R. A. 266, note. In some instances, however,
such transfers were enforced through the doctrine of estoppel arising from
covenants contained in the deed. Johntson v. Johnson (1902) 170 Mo. 34, 70 S. W.
241. Courts of equity have generally enforced such transfers as contracts to con-
vey the legal estate or interest when it has ceased to be an expectancy and has
become a vested estate. Thornton v. Louch (1921) 297 Ill. 204, 13o N. E. 467;
Richey v. Richey (1920, Iowa) 179 N. W. 830; Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 1241, note.
In Kentucky the law is well settled that such a transfer is invalid in both law
and equity and that the doctrine of estoppel will not be applied. Hunt v. Smith
(1921) 191 Ky. 443, 230 S. W. 936. Hence it was impossible in the instant case
to give the intended effect to the instrument. This, however, is an insufficient
basis for giving it the uncontemplated effect of conveying a one-sixth interest
from the mother to the grantee. It was the mother's desire that her six children
share her entire estate equally at her decease. It unquestionably was not her
intention to convey by the instrument an undivided sixth of her land, leaving only
five-sixths to be divided equally at her death among her six children. The court
allowed the son who had deeded away his interest to share further in the division
of the estate at the death of the mother, and treated the consideration given him
for his conveyance as an advancement from his mother's estate, a result not within
the contemplation of the parties to the deed or to the suit. The son intended to
part with his entire interest in his mother's estate and the fact that he received the
consideration and bound himself by the covenant of warranty clearly indicates
that it was he only who was acting as grantor. It is the rule in many jurisdic-
tions that for a transfer of an expectancy to be valid, it must be made with the
knowledge and consent of the ancestor. Stevens v. Stevens (1914) 181 Mich. 438,
148 N. W. 225. The mother took part in the transaction with probably some such
idea in mind. The court, in attempting to uphold the deed as a valid conveyance
of some sort, arrived at an anomalous result which only serves to illustrate the
justice of the rule prevailing in most jurisdictions whereby the conveyance of the
expectancy is held to be valid.
BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCES-COMPLETION OF EQUITABLE LIEN WITHIN FOUR-
MONTHS PMuoD.-A Maryland corporation, about to liquidate, agreed to transfer
its vessels to the defendant. In return, he agreed to give it $73,000, with which
to pay its debts, and to organize a new corporation in Delaware to which he
would redeliver the vessels upon the execution by it of a mortgage of $ioo,ooo
upon the vessels. Upon redelivery to it, the Delaware corporation adopted a reso-
lution authorizing the $IOOOOO mortgage, but the mortgage was not actually given
and recorded until within four months of the filing of a voluntary petition in
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bankruptcy. Held, that the earlier equitable lien of the defendant on the vessels
could not operate as a present consideration to keep the mortgage within the four-
months period from being a preferential transfer. In re New York & Baltimore
Inland Transportation Co. (1921, D. Del.) 276 Fed. 145.
It can no longer be doubted that there are two divergent tendencies in the inter-
pretation of secs. 6o b and 47 a (2) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act as amended in
igio. Act of June 25 (36 Stat. at L. 84o). The tendency of the Supreme Court
has been toward validating a "transfer" of property made within four months,
even in contemplation of insolvency, where there has been an equitable or legal
lien, valid as against the bankrupt, acquired in good faith before the four-months
period. Martin v. Comwercial Bank (1918) 245 U. S. 513, 38 Sup. Ct 176;
(1919) 18 MicH. L. REv. 544. These prior rights may arise under an unrecorded
conditional sale; Baker Ice Machine Co. v. Bailey (1915) 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup.
Ct 50; an unrecorded mortgage; Martin v. Bank, supra; a promise to give as
security for a debt a mortgage on a present or future specific res; Lewin v. Tel-
luride Iron Works Co. (1921, C. C. A. 8th) 272 Fed. 59o; or a promise to give
a present or future specific res as a pledge. Sexton v. Kessler (1911) 225 U. S.
90, 32 Sup. Ct 657; (19o9) 9 COL. L. Rv. 624. However these rights may arise,,
and whether they are enforceable in a court of law or of equity, their significant
similarity, from the point of view of bankruptcy law, lies in two elements; they
are all valid as against the debtor himself, and by the majority of state statutes,
they are invalid only as against a creditor who has actually attached before
recordation or reduction into possession by the lienor. Several cases, however,
in the lower federal courts, have extended the interpretation of the term "prefer-
ence" to include any completion within the four-months period of the position of
a creditor as secured against the claims of other creditors. Lathrop Bank v. Hol-
land (I913, C. C. A. 8th) 205 Fed. 143; Ip re Pittsburgh-Big Muddy Coal Co.
(1914, C. C. A. 7th) 215 Fed. 7o3. Such a view of the policy of preserving the
bankrupt's estate intact for all of his creditors equally, is a normal and perhaps
a desirable extension. (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 3o9. But to support the decision,
as in the instant case, on the ground that the trustee, when appointed, is put in
the position of an attaching creditor by sec. 47 a (2), as amended in i9IO, results,
it must be submitted, in a non sequitur. If the only attaching creditor who has
priority over the equitable or legal lien against the bankrupt is one who actually
attaches the goods before the recordation or reduction into possession takes place,
there is no general creditor in a position to invalidate the mortgage, and, therefore,
the trustee should not be able to do so. Zehner v. Southern Surety Co. (i921,
C. C. A. 3d) 272 Fed. 954. It is only if the trustee is considered in the position
of a creditor who has actually attached at the outset of the four-months period,
and not at its termination, that this result can be reached. Such an interpretation
of sec. 47 a (2) seems particularly strained in view of the fact that the case which
it was expected to correct was one where the first creditor completed his lien by
reducing the goods into possession after the end of the four-months period, i. e.,
after the petition in bankruptcy had been filed, so that the trustee needed to be
placed in the position of an attaching creditor at the moment of his appointment
only, to have a claim prior to that of the secured creditor. York Mfg. Co. v.
Cassell (19o6) 201 U. S. 344, 26 Sup. Ct. 481; Potter Mfg. Co. v. Arthur (1915,
C. C. A. 6th) 220 Fed. 843. The real issue, however, is whether such a comple-
tion of a prior equitable or legal lien should be considered a preference, which the
trustee may avoid under sec. 6o b. And in determining whether the defendant
has been preferred to other creditors of the same class, one may well ask whether
there are any other creditors similarly situated. But whether it is finally decided
that the policy of the Bankruptcy Act is to favor the creditor with the specific
claim at the expense of the one with the general claim or vice versa, it is to be
hoped that there soon will be a Supreme Court decision on the question.
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CARRIERs-EXTENT OF LIABILITY FOR BAGGAGE UNACCOMPANIED BY PASSENGER.-
The plaintiff purchased a ticket to her destination on the defendant's railway and
checked her baggage on the ticket. She later decided to take a different route
and destroyed the passenger ticket The baggage was stolen without fault of the
defendant. In an action for its value, the defendant pleaded that its liability was
only that of a gratuitous bailee. Held, that the defendant was liable as an insurer.
Caine v. Cleveland, etc. Ry. (i92r, Mich.) 185 N. W. 765.
It has now become well settled that a carrier is liable for the loss or destruction
of baggage as an insurer, even though the owner does not travel on the same train.
St. Louis, etc. Ry. v. Dewitt (1914) 115 Ark. 578, 171 S. W. 9o6; Larned v.
Central Ry. (1911) 8I N. J. L. 571, 79 At. 289; McKibben v. Wisconsin Cent.
Ry. (1907) ioo Minn. 27o, 1io N. W. 964; (1912) 46 Am. L. Rnv. 264; (1911)
9p MIcH. L. REv. 707. The ancient rule originated in stage-coach days when bag-
gage was carried as a matter of grace and no checking system existed. It was
obviously not an unjust requirement, in view of the methods of transportation, that
the passenger accompany his owir baggage. Collins v. Boston & Me. Ry. (1852,
Mass.) io Cush. 5o6. And the rule is still necessary in England, where the passen-
ger is required to identify his luggage at the end of the journey. A situation which
has raised more difficulty exists where the owner checks his baggage on a ticket
which he never intends to use. The few adjudicated cases on the point have held
that the carrying of baggage is incidental only to the carrier and passenger relation
and that in purchasing a ticket there is an implied promise to become a passenger.
Marshall v. Pontiac, etc. Ry. (19o) 126 Mich. 45, 85 N. W. 242; Wood v. Maine
Cent. Ry. (1903) 98 Me. 98, 56 Atl. 457; Lusk v. Bloch (1917, Okla.) 168 Pac.
430. It has also been suggested that such a practice may convert passenger trains
into fast freight trains (1914) 5a CAN. L. JoR. 140; (1914) 78 CENT. L. JouR. 55.
On the other hand it has been considered illogical to reduce the liability of a
carrier to that of a gratuitous bailee merely because the owner did not intend to or
did not impose the additional burden of carrying him as a passenger. See Ala.
Great So. Ry. v. Knox (1913) 184 Ala. 485, 63 So. 538. The court, in the instant
case, does not expressly overrule Marshall v. Pontiac, supra, but sees a distinction
in that there was an element of deceit in that case, the plaintiff never having
intended to ride as a passenger. Still it is doubtful whether, in view of modern
usage and the demands of transportation, the earlier decisions will stand.
EVIDENCE-POWER OF COURT TO ORDER PHYsIcAL EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF.-
The court was empowered by statute to order the physical examination of the
plaintiff in an action for personal injuries. N. Y. C. C. P. see. 873 (C. P. A. sec.
3o6). A blood test was considered necessary to determine the nature of the injury.
The plaintiff objected on the ground that an infection might be caused by the
needle in making the puncture required to draw the blood. Held, that the court
could properly order the plaintiff to submit to such a blood test Hayt v. Brewster,
Gordon & Co. (1921) 199 App. Div. 68, 191 N. Y. Supp. 176.
Ever increasing litigation over personal injuries renders important the power
of the courts to order the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination for the
purpose of determining the nAture and extent of the injury. The end sought by
allowing an examination is, of course, a nearer approach to the truth. It is clear
that in the absence of such a power, there is more room for fraud and the ascer-
tainment of truth becomes practically impossible. In the absence of statute, the
authorities are in square conflict as to whether the power exists. The weight of
authority, at least in the number of decisions, seems to recognize such a power.
3 Wigmore, Evidence (19o4) sec. 2220; Schroeder v. Ciicago, etc. Ry. (1877) 47
Iowa, 375; Wanek v. Winona (1899) 78 Minn. 98, 8o N. W. 851; Cincinnati, etc.
Ry. v. Nolan (1914) 161 Ky. 205, 17o S. W. 650; Williams v. Chattanooga Iron
Works (x915) 131 Tenn. 683, 176 S. W. 1O31; State v. Troup (1915) 98 Neb.
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333, 152 N. W. 748; contra, Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford (i89i) 141 U. S. 250,
ii Sup. Ct. iooo; Larson v. Salt Lake City (1908) 34 Utah, 318, 97 Pac. 483.
Several jurisdictions, in which this power was denied, have remedied the defect
by statute. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 3o6; N. J. Comp. Sts. i910, sec. i9; Fla.
Rev. Gen. Sts. 1919, sec. 4968. Once the power is recognized, either by statute
or at common law, the extent to which it may be applied depends necessarily upon
the wording of the statute, if a statute exists, or upon the particular facts of each
case. Whether or not a physical examination in a particular case is necessary
may properly be left to the discretion of the court; as may also the question of
probable physical harm to the plaintiff. Ottawa v. Gilliland (igoi) 63 Kan. 165,
65 Pac. 252; Wanek v. Wiowna, supra; Atkihson v. United Rys. Co. (1921, Mo.)
228 S. W. 483; City of Valparaiso v. Kinney (I92I, Ind.) 131 N. E. 237; Stearns
Coal & Lumber Co. v. Williams (1917) 177 Ky. 698, 198 S. W. 54. Analogous
to this power is that conferred on health officers to examine any person whom
they have reasonable cause to believe to be infected with a venereal disease. Rock
v. Carney (1921, Mich.) I85 N. W. 798. With a proper exercise of discretion
in cases of this kind, and a reasonable degree of care by the courts in ordering
physical examinations, there is little if any danger of causing unnecessary embar-
rassment or physical harm to a plaintiff. The instant case is an excellent example
of a usual and sound exercise of discretion by the court. Considering the condi-
tions which prevail in present day medical practice, it can hardly be seriously
contended that submitting to a simple blood test involves any real danger.
FUTURE INTERESTs-EsTATE IN FEE TAM AS CONTINGENT REMAINDER-
DESTRUCTMlIT.-T devised certain lots to A for life, remainder to B and the
heirs of his body, other land to B and the heirs of his body, and, in the event of
B dying without any children surviving him, all property devised to B to be divided
among certain nephews and nieces. B acquired A's life interest by quit-claim
deed and also procured quit-claim deeds from the nephews and nieces. B then
conveyed his entire interest to C who reconveyed to B. B had no children, was
the sole heir of T, and held the reversion. By statute estates in fee-tail were
changed into a life estate in the donee with a remainder in fee to the person to
whom the estate tail would first pass at common law. Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts. ig1g,
ch. 3o, sec. 6. B brought a bill to quiet title. Held, that the estates limited to
B's children and to the nieces and nephews were contingent remainders and were
destroyed by the merger of the life estate and reversion through the conveyance
to C. Edmiston v. Donovan (1921, Ill.) 133 N. E. 237.
At common law B's estate would have been a fee tail and the subsequent limi-
tations indestructible executory devises. Changed by statute into a life estate with
a remainder in fee to the person to whom the estate tail would first pass according
to common law on the death of B, the remainder is contingent until such a person
is born and consequently at common law destructible by failure of the particular
estate. See Kales, Later History of the Rule of Destructibility of Contingent
Remainders (1919) 28 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 656. For a discussion of such statutes
and their operation, see Kales, Future Interests (2d ed. 192o) secs. 402-405. A
life estate is destroyed by merger when the life estate and reversion come together
in the hands of the same party, there being no vested intervening remainder, except
where the two estates are created by the same instrument. A conveyance by the
holder of the two estates to a third party will thus effect a merger, as in the
instant case. See Kales, Future Interests, sec. 311; I Tiffany, Real. Prdperty
(192o ed.) sec. 34; see McCullough v. Carpenter (1921, Mo.) 225 S. W. 674.
Contingent remainders are now preserved by statutes in many states. See Kales,
Future Interests, sec. io6; I Tiffany, op. cit. secs. 177, 178. Such a statute has
recently been enacted in Illinois. Laws, I921, p. 470. But the court refused to
hold it retroactive. After birth of issue of the donee in tail, the remainder is
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considered vested in Illinois. See Calvert v. Calvert (1921) 297 Ill. 22, 13o N. E.
347; for other possible views see Kales, Future Interests, sec. 405. The operation
of the statute as to estates in fee tail seems rather unexpected as it enabled a
donee in fee-tail to bar subsequent contingent limitations which at common law
would have been indestructible executory interests.
PARTNERSHIP-DISSOLUTION-RIGHTS OF PURCHASER OF EXPIRATION RECORDS
OF AN INSURANCE AGENCY.-The plaintiff and the defendant were formerly part-
ners engaged in business as general insurance agents. Upon dissolution of the
firm the plaintiff purchased all the assets from the receiver including a valuable
record of the expiration dates of various policies. Subsequently the defendant,
in his efforts to secure the busiress of former customers of the firm, used copies
of these expiration records made by him during the partnership's existence. The
insurance companies, which the partnership had served as agent, also gave him
valuable data derived from copies of these records which had been required of
the firm by the companies. The plaintiff sought an injunction alleging the infringe-
ment of his exclusive property rights. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to an
injunction and an accounting of all business obtained by use of the copies made
by the defendant; but that the defendant was privileged to use the information
furnished him by the insurance companies. Chamberlain v. Hemingway (i92I)
97 Conn. 156, 115 Atl. 632.
The good will of the business having been expressly -omitted from the assets
sold, the privilege of either partner to re-enter business for himself and to solicit
former customers of the partnership is unquestioned. Cottrell v. Babcock Mfg.
Co. (1886) 54 Conn. 122, 6 Atl. 791; Williams v. Farrand (1891) 88 Mich. 473,
50 N. W. 446; cf. Trego v. Hunt [1896, H. L.] A. C. 7. The difficult problem
presented by the principal case is to determine the legal relations created by the
sale of the expiration records. Did the plaintiff obtain by his purchase only the
bare physical chattels with the privilege of using the information contained therein,
or did he get in addition thereto a right that the defendant refrain from using this
information, unless derived from sources independent of the records? Was his
privilege of user an exclusive privilege? It is fairly well established that a person
expending both labor and money in accumulating information will be protected in
equity from the piracy of others. International News Service v. Associated Press
(1918) 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct 68; Wintler Abstract and Loan. Co. v. Sears
(1919) io8 Wash. 461, 184 Pac. 309; see COMMENTS (1919) 28 YALE LAW JoUR-
NAL, 387; NOTES (1919) 67 U. PA. L. REv. 191. The principle has been stated
to be that "one shall not reap where one has not sown." International News
Service v. Associated Press, supra. Thus, it has been held that stock quotations
are property and are entitled to Ithe protection of the law. Hunt v. New York
Cotton 'Excliange (19o7) 205 U. S. 322, 27 Sup. Ct 529. And an abstract com-
pany which permitted its abstract books to pass to another by foreclosure sale
was held to have no privilege to use photographic copies which it made of the
books before the sale took place. Wintler Abstract & Loan Co. v. Sears, supra;
see COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 348. The courts have gone so
far as to hold that a rival news syndicate could not use the news gathered by the
agents of the Associated Press even after it had been published on bulletin boards
by members of the latter organization. Interational News Service v. Associated
Press, supra. Under the doctrine of these cases the partnership had the exclusive
privilege of using the data contained in the expiration records. The plaintiff, by
virtue of his purchase of the records, succeeded to this exclusive privilege. Espe-
cially is this true in his relation to the defendant who stands in the position of
vendor to the plaintiff. Any use that the defendant might make of this informa-
tion, if obtained directly or indirectly from the partnership records, would be in
derogation of his grant, and would reduce the value of the subject-matter of the
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sale. See Wintler Abstract & Loan Co. v. Sears, supra. Inasmuch as the
memoranda furnished the defendant by the insurance companies came originally
from the partnership books, it seems that the court should have enjoined the
defendant from employing it in competition with the plaintiff.
PROXImATE CAUSE-WRoNGFUL DEATH-SUICmAL MANIA RESULTING FROM
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL ToRTUF.-The defendant officers of the law, without a
warrant, held the plaintiff's intestate incommunicado in a room of the Department
of justice Building for two months during which they subjected him to "physical
and mental torture" for the purpose of securing information of anarchistic opera-
tions. In a fit of suicidal despondency, he-threw himself out of a fourteenth story
window and was killed. His administratrix brought an action for damages against
the Attorney-General and others. Held, that as the suicide of the intestate oper-
ated to break the chain of causal connection between the act and the death, there
could be no recovery. Salsedo v. Palmer et at. (Dec. 14, 1921) U. S. C. C. A. 2d,
Oct. Term, 1921, No. 59.
The general effect of suicide upon causal connection seems to be that an action
can be maintained only where the suicide results from an uncontrollable influence
or is committed in a delirium or frenzy caused by the defendant's act. Brozrn v.
American Steel & Wire Co. (1909) 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N. E. 8o; Daniels v.
New York, etc. Ry. (19o3) 183 Mass. 393, 67 N. E. 424. The instant case holds
flatly that such a state of irresponsibility or "suicidal mania" was not a natural
result of mental or physical torture and could not have been reasonably antici-
pated. This seems to be the federal rule. Scheffer v. Railroad (1881) l05 U. S.
249. There is a growing tendency to hold that the test of reasonable anticipation
of harm should merely determine the existence of the negligence and once that is
established the tort-feasor should be held responsible for all proximate and natural
results. Watts v. Evansville Ry. (1921, Ind.) 129 N. E. 315; In re Polemis and
Furness, Withy & Co. [i2i, C. A.] 3 K. B. 56o. Where, as in the instant case,
there is a wilful tort, some courts strongly incline to hold the wrongdoer liable
for all proximate consequences, whether probable or not. Wyant v. Crouse
(19Ol) 127 Mich. 158, 86 N. W. 527; see Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions
of Tort (1912) 25 HARv. L. REv. 231, 242-247. Suicide in circumstances similar
to the instant case is not a bar to recovery for the death in actions brought under
the Workmen's Compensation Act. Standard Ins. Co. v. Sponatski (I915) 220
Mass. 526, io8 N. E. 466; Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Ca. (1920, C. A.)
124 L. T. R. 489. It has been suggested that in compensation cases the test of
probability is not applicable even in jurisdictions which apply that test in actions
grounded upon negligence. Milwaukee v. Industrial Commission (1915) 16o Wis.
238, 151 N. W. 247; see also Fiarenso v. Richards Co. (1919) 93 Conn. 581, 107
AtI. 563. Yet in both situations the problem is the same-namely, is there such a
relation of cause and effect as the law will recognize? In its decision in the
principal case the court relied solely upon the Scheffer case, sapra, in which
recovery was denied where the intestate, becoming despondent over his failure to
recuperate from injuries received eight months before in a railroad accident, com-
mitted suicide. The instant case seems distinguishable not only in that it involved
a wilful tort but that the suicide was contemporaneous with the wrongful act.
The Scheffer case has been criticized as "hardly reconcilable with the current of
authority" on this subject. See Beale, The Proximate Causes of an Act (1920)
33 HARV. L. REv. 633, 645. Upon its exceptionally strong facts the instant case
might well have been decided otherwise. However, .a justification for the decision
may perhaps be found in the necessity for a "pragmatic" solution of these ques-
tions in causal connection. See Cardozo, J., in Bird v. St. Paul Ins. Co. (1918)
224 N. Y. 47, 52, 12o N. E. 86, 87- For a further discussion of causal connection
as applicable to similar cases, see (1921) 31 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 1O2.
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QUO WARRANTO-SCOPE OF AcrioN-Nom AVAILABLE AS WRIT OF REvIEW.-
The defendant drainage district, pursuant to a decree of the circuit court extend-
ing its boundaries, included the lands of the relators. An information in the
nature of a quo warranto was instituted alleging that the defendant had unlawfully
exceeded its franchise and praying judgment of ouster. Held, that the action
would not lie. State, ex rel. Manion, v. Albany Drainage District (192i, Mo.)
234 S. W. 339.
An information in the nature of a quo warranto is employed to-day in three
classes of cases: (I) Against public officers in determining disputed questions of
right to hold public office; (2) against private corporations as the appropriate
means of testing the right to exercise corporate franchises and as the proper cor-
rective for misuser, nonuser, or abuse of such franchise; (3) against municipal
corporations to determine the title by which such bodies exercise their franchise
and to correct existing usurpations. High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3d
ed. 1896) chs. 14, 15, 16. In any case, it will lie only for the redress of grievances
in which the public has an interest, although incidental to the relator's own injury.
People, ex rel. Samuell, v. Cooper (i89i) 139 Ill. 461, 29 N. E. 872; Spelling,
Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed. igol) sec. 1773. An
extraordinary remedy, it is exclusive and not available on behalf of a private
relator where the grievance may be redressed by any other action, legal or equit-
able. People v. Hillsdale Turnpike Co. (18o7, N. Y.) 2 John. 19o; Common-
wealth, ex rel. Hunter, v. Smaill (1913) 238 Pa. io6, 85 AtI. io88; see COMMENTS
(1908) 18 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 58. Where another remedy for the redress of
the grievance is provided by statute, unless it is clearly shown that the statutory
method is to be exclusive, the tendency is to hold that quo warranto will also lie.
High, op. cit. see. 617 a. Its issuance rests in the discretion of the court. Att'y-
Gen'l, ex rel. Mann, v. City of Methuen (i921, Mass.) 129 N. E. 662; People v.
City of Le Roy (192o) 293 Ill. 278, 127 N. E. 695. For the Missouri rule see
State, ex rel. McAllister, v. Cupples Power Co. (1920) 283 Mo. 115, 223 S. W.
75. Consequently, it may be refused when the petitioner has been guilty of laches
or a waiver or estoppel can be shown. See State, ex rel. Independent School Dist.,
v. Hall (192I, Iowa) 181 N. W. 633. In the instant case, the information dis-
closed no grievance in which there was a substantial public interest and the relator
had another full and complete legal remedy. The court considered a drainage
district as in effect a municipal corporation and followed the usual rule in refusing
to employ quo warranto to pass upon the irregular or improper exercise of
recognized powers. State v. City of Lyons (87) 3, Iowa, 432; Price v. County
School Trustees (1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 1140. Furthermore, where the
lower court had proper jurisdiction, quo warranto cannot be invoked as a writ of
review. State, ex rel. Cole, v. Norborne Land Drainage District Co. (1921, Mo.)
234 S. W. 344; People, ex rel. Cash, v. Wells (1920) 291 Ill. 584, 126 N. E. 575.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CLAYTON AcT-REsTRCTING USE OF CONTAINER IN SALE
OF CONTENTS-TITLE REMAINING IN VENDOR.-The plaintiff sold acetylene gas in-
tanks to customers under a contract retaining title to the tanks in itself, requiring
an initial deposit and return of the tanks when empty, in exchange for which it
agreed to supply a filled tank for the price of the gas. The defendant, engaged in
a similar business, was soliciting the plaintiff's customers and refilling the plaintiff's
tanks with its own gas. The plaintiff sought an injunction and the defendant
claimed that the tank contracts were in violation of sec. 3 of the Clayton Act.
Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 730). Held, that the method of dealing with
the tanks was not in violation of the Clayton Act. Auto Acetylene Light Co. v.
Prest-o-Lite Co. (I921, C. C. A. 6th) 276 Fed. 537.
A reasonable restriction on the use of real property in a contract of lease or
sale is enforceable. Cowell v. Spring Co. (1879) 100 U. S. 55; 1o Rose's Notes,
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836; see 3 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 642. The use of personalty after
sale cannot be restricted even though the article is patented. Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416. But
before the Clayton Act conditions might be imposed in a lease of personalty unless
the lessor was illegally dominant in its particular field of trade. See United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Co. (1918) 247 U. S. 32, 55, 38 Sup. Ct 473, 482;
see COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io6o; see also Quincy Oil Co. v.
Sylvester (1921, Mass.) 13o N. E. 217. Under section 3 of the Act, if the lease
restricts the use of competitors' wares, goods, or merchandise so as to substan-
tially lessen competition, the restrictive condition is void. United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co. (1916, E. D. Mo.) 234 Fed. 127, (192o, E. D. Mo.) 264 Fed.
138. The inherent or potential viciousness of the contract or lease itself, not its
present operative effect, is the test as to whether it may substantially lessen com-
petition. The purpose of the Act is to prevent rather than cure. See Standard
Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co. (1918, D. Mass.) 254 Fed. 493, 499; see
United States v. Shoe Machinery Co. (1916, E. D. Mo.) 234 Fed. 127, 15o. This
interpretation differs from that of restraint of trade under the Sherman Act in
that no power to restrain need be shown, i. e., the size of the concern maling the
lease or contract has no effect. Cf. opinion of Brown, J., in Standard Fashion
Co. v. Magrane Houston, Co. (I919, C. C. A. ist.) 259 Fed. 793, 8o (judgment
must be based on evidence of effect and on a reasonable belief that there is a
dangerous probability of lessening competition). It has been held that a trading
stamp concern may by contract restrict subscribers to giving out stamps to cus-
tomers only and enjoin third parties from using them for their own advertising;
Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Fenster (1915, E. D. N. Y.) 219 Fed. 755; that a
manufacturer of syrup may restrict its bottling to licensed bottlers; see Coca-
Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons (1916, E. D. Ark.) 229 Fed. 224, 232; that a pub-
lishing company, having built up a staff of newsboys throughout the country, may
restrain their handling other publications even after sale to district agents. Pic-
total Review Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 255 Fed. 2o6
(the boys remained Curtis agents even though title to the magazine had passed
to district agent). But a restriction not to handle other patterns in a two-year
contract of sale was held void. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane Houston Co.
supra. Yet leasing a gas pump on condition that only the lessor's gas be used
in the pump was legal. Canfield Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Coneii. (1921, C. C. A.
6th) 274 Fed. 571; Sinclair Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Con. (1921, C. C. A. 7th) 276
Fed. 686. In the instant case there clearly was not a sale of the container. No
restriction as to the use of a competitor's gas was imposed except that of not
refilling the tank with another's gas. The dominant part of the transaction was
the sale of the gas. Certainly a manufacturer need not supply a rival with con-
tainers by force of the Clayton Act unless he contracts to do so. Nor can such
an arrangement substantially lessen competition. It will be of interest to see the
future development of the term "substantially lessen competition." It is the
teeth of section three of the Act. The tendency seems to be to give it a stricter
interpretation than that applied to a reasonable restraint of trade under the Sher-
man Act. See NOTES (1917) 30 HmAv. L. REv. 72.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-CHOSE IN AcTiON AssIGNED BEFORE MATURITY
SUBJECT TO SET-OFF FOR CLAIM AGAINST ASSIGNOR ACQUIRED BEFORE NoTICE OF
ASSIGNMENT.-The defendant made a contract to pay one Nolan, after one year,
a minimum license fee for certain manufacturing privileges. Before the expira-
tion of the year, Nolan assigned the contract to the plaintiff, who brought suit
to recover the amount due. The defendant pleaded, as a set-off, a claim he held
against Nolan on another contract acquired before notice of the assignment. Held,
that the set-off should be allowed. Nordsell v. Neilsen (1921, Minn.) 184 N. W.
1023.
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Not existing at common law, the right of set-off is purely statutory. Loyd,
Tle Development of Set-off (x916) 64 U. PA. L. REV. 541. The courts are in
considerable confusion, however, as to the extent to which various statutes allow
the defendant to set off claims against the assignor of a chose in action in a suit
by the assignee. The decisions may be conveniently grouped into three classes.
(I) The New York rule is strict in requiring that both claim and set-off must be
due and payable at the time of the assignment. The New York statute provides
that a claim may be set-off if it existed at the time of the assignment and might
have been allowed against the assignor while the contract belonged to him.
C. P. A. sec. 267; Martin v. Kunzmiiller (1867) 37 N. Y. 396; Michigan Sav-
ings Bank v. Miller (19o6, Sup. Ct.) 96 N. Y. Supp. 568; Harrisburg Trust Co.
v. Shufeldt (1898, C. C. A. 9th) 87 Fed. 669. Thus, under the Michigan statute,
which is similarly worded, a creditor cannot set off a mature claim against the
assignee of a chose in action which was not due at the time of the assignment.
Bradley v. Thompson Smith's Sons (1894) 98 Mich. 449, 57 N. W. 576; see
Cosmopolitan. Trust Co. v. Rosenbush (1921, Mass.) 131 N. E. 858. (2) Cali-
fornia represents the other extreme. Section 1459 of the Civil Code of California
provides that the assignee of a contract takes it "subject to all the defenses exist-
ing in favor of the maker at the time of the endorsement," but section 368 of
the Code provides that "the action of the assignee is without prejudice to any
defense existing at the time of or before notice of the assignment" The latter
section is controlling and the Supreme Court has gone so far as to hold that the
claim may be set off even if not mature at the date of the notice, so long as it
is due at the commencement of the action. St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894)
ioI Calif. 286, 35 Pac. 876; contra, Stadler v. First Not. Bank of Helena (1899)
22 Mont I90, 56 Pac. II (holding the first section controls and applying the
New York rule). (3) Many statutes (e. g., Nev. Civil Pract. Act, sec. 46, Rev.
Laws, 1912, sec. 4988) contain only the latter section of the California statute
and this is interpreted, quite logically, to mean that the defendant may set off
any claim which had matured before notice of the assignment Hibernian Bank-
ing Assoc. v. City of Chicago (1913) 178 Ill. App. 138; First Nat. Bank v. Nye
County (1914) 38 Nev. 123, 145 Pac. 932. The instant case is another- illustra-
tion of this. As a matter of abstract justice, it seems fair to extend the doctrine
even as far as the California view. The mere notice of the assignment ought not
to destroy any right which the defendant has acquired against the assignor prior
to the notice, even though that right is not immediately enforceable at that time.
This has been rec6gnized by courts of equity when a debtor is allowed to set off
unmatured claims against the assignee of an insolvent creditor. See Clark, Set-
off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvency and Receivership (192o) 34 Hagv.
L. REV. 178.
SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS CONTAINING A PROvIsION To ARBI-
TRATE.-A contract between A and B gave A the right to dig a tunnel. The plans
for the tunnel were to be.submitted to B for his approval. In case of disagree-
ment an umpire was to be called, and if the parties could not agree upon an
umpire, one X was to act as umpire. A submitted plans to B who refused to
co-operate and threatened to obstruct construction. A thereupon submitted the
plans to X, who approved of them, and then A filed a bill asking that B be
enjoined from obstructing the construction. Held, that the agreement to arbitrate
was subsidiary and incidental and that the injunction be granted, since the remedy
at law was inadequate. Hydraulic Power Co. v. Pettebone-Cataract Paper Co.
(1921, App. Div.) 19I N. Y. Supp. 12.
Equity will usually not grant specific performance of contracts for valuation
or arbitration, even though the legal remedy is inadequate. Fry, Specific Per-
formance ( 4 th ed. i9o3) sec. 356; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence ( 4 th ed.
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igig) sec. 218o. It will not compel the discretionary act of choosing an arbi-
trator or valuer, since the appointee may refuse to act' Hayes, Specific Perform-
ance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation (1916) I CORN. L. QuART. 225.
In addition, the defendant acting because of compulsion would not be likely to
appoint a fair arbitrator or appraiser. Neither will the court appoint one and
enforce his decision, nor itself appraise, as either would be enforcing a contract
not made by the parties. Southern Lumber Corporation v. Doyle (1912, E. D.
S. C.) 2o4 Fed. 829. But exceptions to this rule are recognized. See 8 Ann.
Cas. 664, note; L. R. A. 1917 C, 813, note. Where the clause as to arbitration or
valuation relates to some subsidiary or incidental term, specific performance will
be granted. Thus equity decreed specific performance of a contract to sell an
estate for i24,oop, although containing a stipulation that furniture (valued at
about £2,ooo) should be appraised by valuers mutually agreed upon. Richardson
v. Sinrith (187o) L. R. 5 Ch. App. 648. The court itself has likewise appraised
the value of property under an agreement to buy or sell, on the ground that the
valuation was a subsidiary part of the contract Castle Creek Water Co. v. City
of Aspen. (19o6, C. C. A. 8th) 146 Fed. 8; Tow of Bristol v. Bristol & Warren
Water Works (1896) 19 R. I. 413, 34 AtI. 359. For the same reason it has
appraised the rent to be paid under a renewal lease. Grosvenwr v. Flint (1897) 20
R. I. 21, 37 Atl. 304; see Williams v. Cow Gulch Oil Co. (1921, C. C. A. 8th) 270
Fed. 9. It is submitted, however, that in the last two instances valuation was a
most important element in the contract, and that the purchase price or sum to be
paid was not a mere subsidiary part. The court, by appraisal, made a new contract
for the parties. But such practice may be preferable to abandoning the plaintiff to
whatever damages a jury might assess. In cases where the lessor, contrary to his
agreement, refused to appoint a valuer of improvements made by the lessee, it
has been held grossly inequitable to allow the lessor to appropriate the improve-
ments without payment. Hug v. Van Burkleo (1874) 58 Mo. 2o2; see Castle
Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, supra. The alternate provision in the instant
case, that X act as umpire, if no other could be agreed upon, and X's willingness
to act, appear at first glance to make this a simple case for equity jurisdiction.
But as B refused to participate, X could not "umpire," and the actual contract of
the parties could not be enforced, due, however, to B's wrongful act. The decree
of the court in granting relief to A is sound, and in accord with an increasing
number of cases. The application of the New York arbitration law does not enter
into the decision of this case. Laws, 1920, ch. 275. As to its effect, see Cohen,
Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute (1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
147.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAx-TRANSfER INTENDED TO TAKE EmECT AT
DONOR'S DEATH.-The decedent during his life-time created certain trust estates of
which the income was to be paid, beginning at the date of creation of the trusts,
to certain named beneficiaries for their lives, the corpus to be variously distributed
thereafter. The decedent retained a power of revocation of the trusts. The tax
commissioners sought to tax the trust deeds under the transfer tax law on the
ground that there had been a transfer of property intended to take effect in posses-
sion or enjoyment at the death of the donor. N. Y. Cons. Laws, igog, ch. 6o, see.
220 (4). Held, that the trust deeds were not liable to such taxation. In re Coch-
raune's Estate (1921, Surro.) 19o N. Y. Supp. 895.
When a donor alienates the corpus of an estate and reserves the income thereof
to himself during his life, giving a life estate in the income to some other person
thereafter, the transfer is held to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the
death of the donor. People v. Shaffer (192o) 291 Ill. 142, 125 N. E. 887; cf.
Nickel v. State (1919) 43 Nev. 12, 185 Pac. 565; In re Bottomley's Estate (192o)
92 N. J. Eq. 2o2, iii At. 6o5. But such a transfer, though not taking effect in
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enjoyment until the donor's death, nevertheless effects a transfer at the time of the
alienation of the corpus, and its status is determined by the laws existing at that
time. In re Brix's Estate (1919) 181 Calif. 667, 186 Pac. 135. If the donor also
retains a power of revocation of the corpus, or its income, no transfer takes place
until the death of the donor. It re Allis' Will (1921, Wis.) 184 N. W. 381;
contra, It re Murphy's Estate (192o) 182 Calif. 740, 19o Pac. 46. In such a case
the law existing at the time of the donor's death controls the status of the transfer.
Matter of Danau Co. (1915) 215 N. Y. 461, log N. E. 557; Gleason & Otis,
Inheritance Taxation (1919) 131. When the corpus of an estate is alienated, and
the alienor retains only a power of revocation, but does not reserve the income,
permitting it instead to flow at once to the life beneficiary, then immediate enjoy-
ment vests in the beneficiary, and if in fact the estate is not revoked, the transfer
takes effect in possession or enjoyment at the time of the alienation of the corpus.
It is therefore not taxable as a transfer intended to take effect at the death of the
donor. People v. Northern Tritst Company (1919) 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662;
(1920) 29 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 464. But if -the alienor of the corpus retains a
substantial control over the corpus and its income, and not merely a power of
revocation, the transfer takes effect in possession or enjoyment at the transferor's
death, even though he permits benefits at once to flow to the transferee. Matter
of Bostwick (1899) 16o N. Y. 489, 55 N. E. 2o8. In any given instance of this class
of cases a clear analysis of the actual facts constituting the transfer of benefits
or the retention of control by a donor should be more important in determining the
issue than the unanalytical application of principles necessarily tending to involve
the metaphysical definition of transfer. But perhaps the following generalizations
may be drawn from the reasoning of th(#cases: In determining when a transfer is
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment, the courts look to two things,---
the flow of benefits to the transferee, and the control retained by the transferor.
If no control is retained, or only a power of revocation, the transfer is intended to
take effect when the flow of benefits to the transferee begins. If a larger degree
of control is retained, the transfer is said to take effect at the donor's death,
whether the flow of benefits begins then or earlier.
ToRTs-CoNspmAcy iqoT o Isupx-MALicIous MoTmv.-The plaintiff, a retail
grocer, had a dispute with an insurance adjustment company, which was settled
in a legal action. In order to punish the plaintiff for not settling the matter out-
side of court, the defendant adjustment company and the agents of other insur-
ance companies refused to write insurance upon the plaintiff's stock. The
plaintiff sued for resulting damage. The intermediate court held that malice
alone would not support the action. Held, that a conspiracy or combination,
when actuated by malice, is actionable and that damages should be awarded.
Griffin v. Palatine Ins. Co. (1921, Tex. Com. of App.) 235 S. W. 202.
The troublesome word "malice" has been used in the instant case to mean
malevolence, and not mere absence of excuse. The court seems to be on danger-
ous ground in stating that an act, legal when done by an individual, becomes
unlawful when done by several persons acting together. Allen v. Flood [1898,
H. L.] A. C. i; but see (191) 33 L. P. A. (N. s.) 1O34, 1O38 note. A con-
spiracy is merely a combination of two or more persons, in concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself criminal
or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. Pettibone v. United States (1893)
148 U. S. 197, 13 Sup. Ct. 542; but see Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfg's Assoc.
(1)15) 221 Mass. 554, O9 N. E. 643. Thus if the act itself is legal, a conspiracy
to do this act becomes unlawful only if the defendants use more than persuasion
on each other. The conspiracy to do an illegal act, or a legal act by unlawful
means, should merely operate to increase damages and not affect the question of
the tort itself. If maliciousness is to be the crux of the decision, the court should
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be willing to decide that the act of the defendant, if done maliciously, is action-
able whether done by an individual or by a combination of individuals. Had one
of the defendants in the instant case been the sole agent for all the companies,
the court would have been forced to change its position. There is some'authority
for holding that a malicious act, injuring a person in his business, is actionable.
Tuttle v. Buck (io9) lO7 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946; Ames, Tort because of
Wrongful Motive (9o5) i8 HAxv. L. REV. 411; but see Jeremiah Smith, Crucial
Issues in Labor Litigation (19o7) 2o HAav. L. REv. 251, 451. Malice as the
deciding factor will bring law and ethics into closer relation. Ames, Law and
Morals (i9o8) 22 HARv. L. Rxv. 97. It is but an extension of the rule applied in
malicious prosecution and similar cases, and should undoubtedly be encouraged.
WiLs-REvoCATION BY SUBSEQUENT MAmRIAGE.-A testator provided in his
will that, in the event of his being married at the time of his death, his widow
should have a certain bequest. He later married and died. His widow contested
the probate under a statute providing that marriage should be deemed a revoca-
tion of a prior will. Hurd's Ill. Rev. Sts. i919, ch. 39, sec. io. Held, (two
judges dissenting) that the will had been revoked. Gillrnann v. Dressier (1921,
II1.) 133 N. E. 186.
The ecclesiastical courts incorporated in the common law the civil-law prin-
ciple that marriage and birth of issue revoked a husband's prior will. But
whether the revocation resulted as a "presumption of fact" or "an inference of
law" was in confusion. Under the former view, based on the presumption that
the change of circumstance had caused the testator to alter his intent, a provision
in the will for the wife and child prevented revocation. Lugg v. Lugg (1697,
Eccl.) 2 Salk. 592; Kenebel v. Scrafton (18o2, K. B.) 2 East, 529. Other courts
treated the revocation as arising from in implied condition annexed to the will.
Lancashire v. Lancashire (1792, K. B.) 5 T. R. 49. In such an event the testa-
tor's purpose to have the will remain valid was immaterial. Marston v. Fox
(1838, Exch.) 8 Adol. & El. 14. Then, by statute, marriage alone was made an
absolute revocation of a prior will. (1837) 7 Wil. IV & i Vict. c. 26, sec. 18.
This provision was generally incorporated in many American statutes, and
Illinois and some other states reached the same result without legislation after
the wife became an heir. Tyler v. Tyler (1857) 19 Ill. 151; contra, Vanek v.
Vanek (1919) 1O4 Kan. 624, i8o Pac. 24o. The early difference of opinion in
England as to the conclusiveness of the implication was also reflected in deci-
sions in this country. The majority have considered the effect of marriage to be
an absolute revocation. Francis v. Marsh (1904) 54 W. Va. 545, 46 S. E. 573.
On the other hand Illinois adopted the minority view, allowing the testator's
intent to rebut the presumption. Tyler v. Tyler, supra; see also Wheeler v.
Wheeler (i85o) I R. I. 364. This was deemed to have been so incorporated into
the state statutory law that a will, providing for a bequest upon marriage to a
designated fiancde, was not considered annulled by the subsequent marriage.
Ford v. Greenawalt (1920) 292 Ill. 121, 126 N. E. 555; (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv.
95. The court, however, refused to uphold the presumption theory to the extent
of going outside of the will to find the intention of the testator. Wood v. Corbin
(1921) 296 Ill. 129, 129 N. E. 553; (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 95. The instant
case held that a will making provision for the contingency of some indefinite
person surviving the testator as widow does not reveal an intent which will rebut
the statutory presumption of revocation. Thus the majority of the court declined
to follow the presumption theory to its logical conclusion and seemed to realize
that the definiteness which results from a strict construction of such a statute is
more desirable than carrying out the testator's intent. Both a certainty of result
and respect for testamentary intent can easily be attained by a statute expressly
excepting an instrument making provision for a future wife from otherwise
absolute revocation. See In re Adler's Estate (9o9) 52 Wash. 539, ioo Pac. 1O19.
